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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Using  the  test  of Granger-causality  in  tail of  Hong  et  al. (2009),  we  deﬁne  and  construct  Granger-causality
tail  risk  networks  between  33 systemically  important  banks  (G-SIBs)  and  36  sovereign  bonds  worldwide.
Our  purpose  is to  exploit  the  structure  of  the  Granger-causality  tail  risk  networks  to identify  periods  of
distress  in ﬁnancial  markets  and  possible  channels  of  systemic  risk  propagation.  Combining  measures
of  connectedness  of these  networks  with  the  ratings  of the  sovereign  bonds,  we  propose  a  ﬂight-to-
quality  indicator  to identify  periods  of turbulence  in  the market.  Our  measure  clearly  peaks  at  the  onset
of the  European  sovereign  debt  crisis, signaling  the  instability  of  the  ﬁnancial  system.  Finally,  we  use
the  connectedness  measures  of  the  networks  to forecast  the  quality  of  sovereign  bonds.  We  ﬁnd  that
connectedness  is a signiﬁcant  predictor  of  the  cross-section  of  bond  quality.
©  2018  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).eywords:
inancial stability
ystemic risk propagation
ranger-causality
overeign debt crisis
lliquidity
light-to-quality
. Introduction
The surge of market distress and the rapid spread of uncertainty
ay  lead a signiﬁcant number of market players to rethink their pri-
rities and investment strategies triggering a rebalancing of their
ortfolios (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008). When investors
ave similar portfolios, coordinated rebalancing might lead to mas-
ive sales of risky assets (Cont and Wagalath, 2013, 2016; Corsi
 This work is supported by the European Community H2020 Program under
he  scheme INFRAIA-1-2014-2015: Research Infrastructures, grant agreement
\#$654024, SoBigData: Social Mining and Big Data Ecosystem (http://www.
obigdata.eu). We thank Flavia Barsotti, Umberto Cherubini, Piero Mazzarisi and
ldo  Nassigh for useful comments and discussions, and Andrea Basile and Andrea
illari for providing the data.
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572-3089/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).et al., 2016) and purchases of safer ones. These episodes are known
as “ﬂight-to-quality” and can play a prominent role in the propa-
gation and deepening of ﬁnancial crises. The ability of identifying
and possibly anticipating such phenomena is of great importance
in the context of early-warning and monitoring of systemic risk
(Demirgüc¸ -Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart,
1999; Harrington, 2009; Scheffer et al., 2009, 2012; Barrell et al.,
2010; Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011; Kritzman et al., 2011; Allen
et al., 2012; Arnold et al., 2012; Bisias et al., 2012; Merton et al.,
2013; Oet et al., 2013).
The literature on the identiﬁcation and characterization of
ﬂight-to-quality episodes has followed two main streams. The
ﬁrst one, followed for example by Beber et al. (2009), investi-
gates proprietary data on order ﬂow looking for direct evidences
of ﬂight-to-quality episodes. The second one exploits publicly
available price data, and uses econometric tools to identify peri-
ods of ﬂight-to-quality (Baur and Lucey, 2009; Dovern and van
Roye, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2015; Adrian and Brunnermeier,
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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016; Brownlees and Engle, 2016). The method we propose in
his paper belongs to the second class and constructs Granger-
ausality tail risk networks using the idea of Granger-causality
n tail of Hong et al. (2009). We  apply our approach to iden-
ify ﬂight-to-quality from systemically important banks (G-SIBs)
oward sovereign bonds worldwide.
Sovereign debt securities form a considerable fraction of banks’
otal assets and since big market players are usually levered insti-
utions pursuing a pro-cyclical leverage1 strategy (Adrian and
hin, 2010, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2015), periods of ﬁnancial
istress can be triggered by banks massively selling their assets
o recover their optimal leverage level after a shock. Moreover,
he micro-prudential regulation requires ﬁnancial institutions to
djust their capital depending on the level of risk of their portfo-
io. As banks are subject to risk-based capital ratio constraints, they
ay  be also forced to rebalance their portfolios toward safer assets
o comply with the regulation (Cifuentes et al., 2005; Braouezec
nd Wagalath, 2016). Following these arguments, we expect that
 ﬂight-to-quality episode has good chance to be identiﬁed in
he bank-sovereign bond system. Within this system, we should
bserve two reinforcing effects in times of distress. First, investors
elling banks’ stocks and “bad” sovereign bonds, while performing
assive purchases of “good” bonds. Second, distressed banks pur-
uing a de-leveraging strategy or complying with the regulatory
onstraint selling low-rated bond holdings. Hence, due to market
mpact and assets’ illiquidity, large movements of bond prices (and
ence of bond yields) are expected as a consequence of large equity
rops of banks.
In order to econometrically identify this chain of events from
arket prices, we propose to use the Granger-causality test in tail
f Hong et al. (2009), which allows to test if the occurrence of a
eft or right tail event of a random variable is systematically fol-
owed (in a statistical sense) by the occurrence of a left or right
ail event of a second random variable. We  study the causal rela-
ionships in tail between 33 systemically important banks2 and 36
overeign bonds and cast this information in bank-bond bipartite
etworks3 where the link between a bank and a bond indicates the
xistence of Granger-causality in tail. We  deﬁne measures of con-
ectedness for the Granger-causality tail risk networks that have a
imple economic interpretation as indicators of ﬁre-sales and ﬁre-
uys, under the assumption that the fundamentals of the analyzed
ssets do not change over the considered period. Combining these
easures with Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ratings, we can thus identify
eriods of simultaneous “bad” bond ﬁre-sales and “good” bond ﬁre-
uys.4 This double effect corresponds to a natural characterization
f ﬂight-to-quality, where the general distrust pushes investors
oward low-risk assets, by freeing resources from high-risk ones.
Finally, we investigate the ability of our network connectedness
easures of forecasting the future quality rankings of the sovereign
onds. We  deﬁne four time-varying bond quality measures based
n the correlation between CDS spreads and the bond yields, the
ond yield volatility, and the yield spreads,5 and test the out-of-
ample forecasting performances of our connectedness measures.
ost importantly, the four quality measures are all market-based
roxies of the sovereign debts quality, and so they can provide
1 In periods of extraordinary distress and uncertainty, de-leveraging is a common
trategy also for ﬁnancial institution not actively managing their leverage, see Chen
t  al. (2014).
2 In particular, we  rely on the deﬁnition of G-SIBs deﬁned by Basel III regulatory
ramework. For more detail, see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
3 A bipartite network is a graph whose vertices can be divided into two disjoint
ets  such that every edge connects a vertex in one set to one in the other set.
4 The precise deﬁnition of bad and good bonds will be clariﬁed later.
5 Yield spreads are deﬁned as the difference between a government bond yield
nd the German bond yield at the same maturity.l Stability 38 (2018) 18–36 19
insightful information to surveillance authorities. We ﬁnd that dur-
ing periods of distress, the connectedness of the Granger-causality
tail risk networks is a signiﬁcant predictor of the ranking of the
bond quality measures.
Our work contributes to several strands of literature. Concerning
ﬂight-to-quality, the analysis by Beber et al. (2009) sheds insight-
ful light on how liquidity and quality are chased in the market.
Unusual capital ﬂows are used in Beber et al. (2009) to proxy ﬂights,
both to liquidity and to quality. However this kind of data are
unavailable, partial, or very difﬁcult to collect. Deﬁning an econo-
metric measure of ﬂight-to-quality based on easily available daily
market prices, considerably reduces the data requirements in our
approach. This allows us to considerably extend the time span of
our analysis compared to the one in Beber et al. (2009), consider-
ing the equity and bond market developments from the beginning
of 2006 to February 2014. As a consequence, our analysis proﬁts
from the presence of two  important periods of ﬁnancial distress. In
exchange, we  pay a price in terms of interpretation of our results.
As we  do not directly observe trading activity, we  cannot distin-
guish between a bank reacting to a large drop of its equity value
with a ﬂight-to-quality on the sovereign debt market, and a similar
ﬂight-to-quality operated by a large institutional investor liquidat-
ing bank stocks. In both cases there will be unexpected variation of
the sovereign bond yields as a consequence of large equity drops
of the banks involved. As anticipated above, we  operate under
the assumption that the assets’ fundamentals are stable over the
period, and interpret the extreme market movements as if they
were fully generated by price-mediated contagion. Our  analysis
is thus representative of a worst case scenario ﬂight-to-quality.
Nonetheless, we uncover interesting aspects of the ﬂight-to-quality
dynamics that are relevant from a systemic risk management per-
spective and for regulators. Complementing the results of Beber
et al. (2009), we document that investors, do chase for quality dur-
ing ﬁnancial crises, but they do it in different ways: in some cases,
such as during and after the Lehman crisis, they simply chase qual-
ity by buying sovereign debt of any type, while in others, such as
during the European sovereign debt crisis, they require only top-
quality sovereign debt, i.e. the ﬂight-to-quality occurs exclusively
toward AAA-rated sovereign bonds.
Another ﬂight-to-quality paper related to ours is Baur and Lucey
(2009). Here the authors deﬁne [. . .]  ﬂight-to-quality from stocks to
bonds as a signiﬁcant decrease in the correlation coefﬁcient in a (stock
market) crisis period compared to a benchmark period resulting in a
negative correlation level. In summary Baur and Lucey (2009) look
for signiﬁcant negative changes of the bond-stock correlation that
result in a change of the sign of the correlation from positive to neg-
ative, or from negative to even more negative. The rationale is that
ﬂight-to-quality is identiﬁed by stocks and bonds moving in oppo-
site directions, hence it is not enough that the correlation decreases,
it must turn into a negative value. The econometric tools presented
in our paper share with Baur and Lucey (2009) the appealing feature
of being based on easily accessible data but substantially differs
from it along two  lines. First, instead of looking to signiﬁcantly
changes of correlations, we put the focus on signiﬁcant causality
links between extreme variations of stocks (of large banks) and
extreme variations of bond yields (of the sovereign type). Second,
while in Baur and Lucey (2009) periods of crises are inputed in the
model via a dummy  variable and thus are identiﬁed ab initio, in
our approach we backtest that the risk measures do in fact peak
around crises, hence reinforcing their role as indicators of ﬁnancial
distress. We  also contribute to the literature on ﬁnancial distress. In
particular, our work is related to the paper by Dovern and van Roye
(2014). Here the authors deﬁne a country-speciﬁc index of ﬁnan-
cial stress without explicitly adopting a network approach. In fact,
a factor model is used in order to extract, from a country-speciﬁc
basket of stationary and standardized indicators of ﬁnancial stress,
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 common component which is used as unique indicator of ﬁnancial
tress for that country. Transmission of stress is then captured via
 GVAR model (Pesaran et al., 2009). Our philosophy shares with
hat of Dovern and van Roye (2014) the idea of deﬁning indica-
ors of ﬁnancial distress via an econometric approach that takes
ully into consideration data heteroskedasticity, hence removing
ias induced by sudden variations of the volatility regime of the
ssets involved. Nevertheless, there is a striking difference since
ur approach focuses on tail events and, for this reason, is designed
o analyze propagation of ﬁnancial distress.
Finally, we relate to the literature on Granger-causality net-
orks. These have been introduced in systemic risk studies by Billio
t al. (2012) to identify and quantify periods of ﬁnancial turbulence,
haracterized by abnormal levels of Granger inter-connectedness
mong equities of hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insur-
nce companies. Our paper, although being inspired by the analysis
f Billio et al. (2012), moves away from it in at least two respects:
rst, we adopt a bipartite network of equities and bonds, a choice
ictated by the will of investigating the effect of crises on sovereign
ebt and, second, we adopt the Granger-causality test in the tail by
ong et al. (2009), since we believe that it is suited to describe
vents pertaining to a crisis.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the test of
ranger-causality in tail of Hong et al. (2009) and explains the con-
truction of a Granger-causality tail risk network. Section 3 gives
he detail of the investigated dataset. Section 4 describes the struc-
ure of the bank-bond Granger-causality tail risk networks. Section
 presents and discusses our ﬂight-to-quality indicator. Section 6
escribes the out-of-sample forecasts of the bond quality based on
he connectedness of the Granger-causality tail risk networks. Sec-
ion 7 concludes. Technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
. Constructing a Granger-causality tail risk network
To construct a bank-bond Granger-causality tail risk network,
e rely on an econometric approach that only requires time series
f banks’ equity returns6 and sovereign bond yields. This has the
dvantage of being implementable at any frequency (weekly, daily
r even higher, depending on the availability of data) without
equiring any not publicly available dataset, such as order ﬂow data,
hich are notoriously very hard to obtain.
We deﬁne a bank-bond Granger-causality tail risk network as
 bipartite network where banks and bonds form the two sets of
odes, and the existence of a bank-bond edge is established with the
est of Granger-causality in tail of Hong et al. (2009). Rejection of the
ull hypothesis of the test provides statistical support for a causal
elationship in the tail between a bank and a bond, and an edge is
reated. Depending on the direction of causality (bank⇐⇒ bond) and
he side of the tail (upper or lower), eight Granger-causality tail risk
etworks can be investigated.
The Granger-causality test in tail of Hong et al. (2009) is the
conometric tool at the core of the network construction. Consider
wo time series
{
Y1,t
}T
t=1 and
{
Y2,t
}T
t=1, such as bond yield varia-ions and equity log-returns, and suppose to test whether extreme
vents in the lower tail of Y2,t Granger-cause extreme events in
he lower tail7 of Y1,t. The ﬁrst step of the procedure is to iden-
ify which are the extreme events in the history of both series.
6 We could, in principle, extend the analysis to other types of stocks or indexes.
ur results show, however, that focusing on the bank-bond system is largely sufﬁ-
ient to identify crises and ﬂight-to-quality phenomena, so for conciseness we  do
ot consider stocks different from banks’ equities and we  restrict the analysis to this
inimal data requirement.
7 Equivalent procedures apply when testing for Granger-causalities in the other
ails  or reversed causality.l Stability 38 (2018) 18–36
For this purpose, following the approach of Hong et al. (2009), we
estimate a parametric model for the conditional (on past history)
Value-At-Risk (VaR) of
{
Y1,t
}T
t=1 and
{
Y2,t
}T
t=1. For the parametric
model, as well as the numerical routines, we borrow from the pop-
ular CAViaR approach developed by Engle and Manganelli (2004).
This class of models fully satisﬁes the assumptions required for the
application of the Hong et al. (2009) test. For more details about the
VaR model and the corresponding parameter estimates we refer
to Appendix A. The outcome of the Engle and Manganelli (2004)
procedure is a parametric estimate of the conditional VaR series{
V (˛)
i,t
}T
t=1
deﬁned in the standard fashion
Prob
[
Yi,t ≤ −V (˛)i,t | Ft−1
]
= ˛, i = 1, 2,
where Ft denotes the information available at time t and  ˛ deﬁnes
the probability level. In the empirical analysis, we choose  ˛ = 10%
as a trade-off between the necessity of focusing on extreme events
and that of having a sufﬁciently high number of observations.8 Once
the two  conditional VaR series have been estimated we can apply
the one-way Granger-causality test by Hong et al. (2009). Deﬁne
the series of hits as9 {Z1,t}Tt=1 and {Z2,t}Tt=1, with Zi,t ≡ 1{Yi,t<−V (˛)i,t },
the test compares the null
H
0
1 : E
[
Z1,t |
{
Y1,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
= E
[
Z1,t |
{
Y1,t−k, Y2,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
(1)
against the alternative
H
A
1 : E
[
Z1,t |
{
Y1,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
/= E
[
Z1,t |
{
Y1,t−k, Y2,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
. (2)
The interpretation of H01 and H
A
1 is straightforward. If the null
hypothesis is rejected it means that the occurrence of a large
event in Y2,t has signiﬁcantly impacted the probability of a future
occurrence of a extraordinary event in Y1,t, and we say that Y2,t
Granger-cause Y1,t in the tail. The rejection of the null, hence the
creation of the bank-bond link in the network, occurs if and only
if for several times in the time interval considered an extreme
negative log-return of the bank equity is followed by an extreme
negative variation of the bond yield.
Note that the conditioning information includes at most instant
t − 1, while the conditioned event
{
Y1,t < −V (˛)1,t
}
is occurring at t,
whence the genuine causality of the approach. We pay particular
care in the construction of both the VaR measure and the Granger-
causality test to fully preserve causality using, at any point in time,
only past information. Appendix A describes in detail the solution
adopted.
Let ˆ (j) be the sample cross-correlation function between{
Z1,t
}T
t=1 and
{
Z2,t
}T
t=1 at positive lag j, i.e.
ˆ (j) = Cˆ (j)
S1 S2
,8 Results with other choices of  ˛ are available upon request.
9 We indicate with 1{A} the indicator function of the event A, that is for all ω in
the  probability space 
1{A} (ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ A
0 if ω /∈ A.
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As in Billio et al. (2012), we  are interested in periods in which the
density of the network (also called connectedness) deviates fromF. Corsi et al. / Journal of Fin
here S2
i
= ˛i (1 − ˛i) and Cˆ (j) = T−1
∑T
t=1+j
(
Z1,t − ˛1
)  (
Z2,t−j − ˛
ith j = {1, 2, . . .,  T − 1} and ˛i = T−1
∑T
t=1Zi,t . Hong et al. (2009)
how that, under H01
1 (M) =
T
∑T−1
j=1 k
(
j
M
)2
ˆ(j)2 − C1,T (M)
D1,T (M)
1
2
D→N (0, 1)
hen both the number of observations T → ∞ and the bandwidth
 = c T→ ∞ (c > 0, 0 <  < 12 ), where k (x) is a suitable kernel
unction,10 and C1,T (M) and D1,T are known constants. Note that
ˆ (j) considers only positive values of the lag j, i.e. lagged correla-
ion between past observations of Z2,t and future observations of
1,t (since we are testing the causal relation of the second variable
n the ﬁrst one). Under HA1 it is
M1/2
T
Q1 (M)
p→ 1(
2
∫ ∞
0
k(z)4 dz
) 1
2
∞∑
j=1
ˆ(j)2,
hich implies that the test has asymptotic unit power at any con-
dence level. If Q1 (M)>  cˇ, where cˇ is the ˇ-quantile of a Normal
istribution function with zero mean and unit standard deviation,
hen we say that
{
Y2,t
}T
t=1 Granger-causes the series
{
Y1,t
}T
t=1
n the tail. Throughout the analysis we choose  ˇ = 95% and hence
ˇ = 1.6449. Moreover, following the small-sample properties of the
est as reported by Hong et al. (2009), we set M = 5 for the value of
he bandwidth parameter.
For completeness and in order to compare our results with
hose of Billio et al. (2012), we also construct a bank-bond net-
ork where connections are established with the standard Granger
1969) causality test. Differently from Hong et al. (2009), Granger
1969) tests for causality in the conditional mean of Y1,t and Y2,t, i.e.
t tests the null hypothesis
0
G : E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
= E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k, Y2,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
(3)
gainst the alternative
A
G : E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
/= E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k, Y2,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
. (4)
he main difference between the couple of null-alternative
ypotheses in (3) and (4) and those in (1) and (2) is the substi-
ution of the series Yi,t with Zi,t, which signals the presence of tail
vents. Therefore, when H0G is rejected we say that Y2,t Granger-
ause Y1,t in the mean. Details on the construction of this network
an be found in Appendix C.
. The dataset
Our dataset is composed of j = 1, . . .,  33 equities of global sys-
emically important banks (G-SIBs) deﬁned by Basel III regulatory
ramework and i = 1, . . .,  36 sovereign debt bonds (with a matu-
ity of 5 years) of different countries in America, Europe and Asia.
e indicate with  i,t the nominal 5-years maturity bond yield of
ountry i at day t. All the time series of bonds and equities end on
ebruary, 14, 2014, but they start at different dates. Equities are
ostly available by the end of the nineties, while bonds become
vailable after the beginning of 2000. For each country i we  have
lso at our disposal the daily time series of ﬁve-years maturity
DS spread, a quantity that we indicate as Si,t henceforth. Most
f the CDS spread time series end on January, 13, 2014 and are
vailable since early 2000s. Detailed information, along with Tables
10 In our analysis we  adopt the Daniell kernel k (x) = sin ( x)/x.l Stability 38 (2018) 18–36 21
with summary statistics, on the three blocks of data are provided
in Appendix B.
Finally, we  mention that in Section 6.1, in order to properly
deﬁne the quality measures based on the correlation between CDS
spreads and bond yields, we  require a proxy for the risk-free inter-
est rate r. For each bond, depending on the currency, we  use the
zero-coupon curve of the corresponding maturity and currency
derived by a bootstrapping procedure.11
4. The bank-bond Granger-causality tail risk networks
Since our interest is exploring ﬁnancial distress identifying
ﬂight-to-quality episodes in the bank-bond system, we mainly
focus our analysis on the causal relationship between the left tail
(losses) of the bank equity distribution and both the left and right
tails of the bond yield distribution. Under the assumption of stable
fundamentals, causal shocks between the tails can be economi-
cally interpreted as fully generated by price-mediated contagion.
In particular, a negative shock to the equity of bank j causing large
negative yield variations to the bond of country i can be interpreted
as a bond appreciation due to massive purchases, or ﬁre-buy. A neg-
ative shock to a bank equity suddenly increasing the bond yield of
a country can be interpreted as a ﬁre-sale on the corresponding
sovereign debt inducing a strong depreciation. Both mechanisms
can be induced by either a large institutional investor liquidating
risky assets (banks’ stocks and low-rated sovereign bonds) and buy-
ing sovereign debts of countries with strong ﬁscal discipline, or
the management of a bank experiencing an equity drop that reacts
selling the risky bonds in its balance sheet, while simultaneously
purchasing high quality bonds, to re-equilibrate the regulatory risk-
based capital ratio above the minimum level established by the
regulator.
Our identiﬁcation of ﬁre-sales and ﬁre-buys is based on an
econometric analysis of equity returns and bond yield variations
rather than balance sheet data. Therefore, we  can only argue that
a distressed sale or distressed buy occurs in a statistical sense. For
this reason, we  establish the existence of a statistical ﬁre-sale (sta-
tistical ﬁre-buy) between bank j and bond i when the Hong et al.
(2009) test supports a causal relationship between the lower tail of
the bank and the upper (lower) tail of the bond.
We perform a dynamic analysis of the Granger-causality tail
risk networks of statistical ﬁre-sales and ﬁre-buys over the period
2003–2014. We consider a rolling-window approach with a win-
dow of three-year length12 and one-month updates. For a given
time-window t, we  compute the networks with the procedure set
forth in Section 2 using two-day equity returns and two-day bond
yield variations, to mitigate asynchronicity effects due to the time
zones. We  use
(
Ej ⇒ BSelli
)
t
and (Ej ⇒ BBuyi )t to denote statistically
signiﬁcant ﬁre-sale and ﬁre-buy links, respectively. The subscript
t is indicating that the causal networks are time-dependent since
they are computed using observations prior to the end of the tth
time-window.
For comparison purposes, we  also compute the network with
the standard Granger (1969) causality test brieﬂy outlined in Sec-
tion 2. We  denote the signiﬁcant links of the network as
(
Ej ⇒ Bi
)
t
,
whenever the equity return of bank j Granger-causes the yield vari-11 All the zero-coupon curves are elaborated, via a bootstrapping procedure rep-
resenting the best-practice in the industry, by a dedicated desk of UniCredit Group.
12 The choice of three years balances the trade-off between the power of the
Granger test (as reported in the simulation study of Hong et al., 2009) and the need
of  localizing periods of ﬁnancial distress.
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ts expected value under the null of no-causal relationships, since
his deviation may  signal the presence of systemic events. As a ﬁrst
nvestigation, we deﬁne the connectedness measures
DSellt ≡
1
NEt N
B
t
NEt∑
j=1
NBt∑
j=1
1{(Ej⇒BSelli )t }
,
DBuyt ≡
1
NEt N
B
t
NEt∑
j=1
NBt∑
j=1
1{(Ej⇒BBuyi )t }
,
Dt ≡ 1
NEt N
B
t
NEt∑
j=1
NBt∑
j=1
1{(Ej⇒Bi)t }.
(5)
here NEt and N
B
t represent, respectively, the total number of avail-
ble equities and bond series in the tth network. DSellt and D
Buy
t are
he fractions of validated causal links for the signiﬁcant statistical
re-sales
(
Ej ⇒ BSelli
)
t
and ﬁre-buys (Ej ⇒ BBuyi )t . For completeness,
e also deﬁne Dt as the percentage of validated links of the Granger-
ausality in mean network,
(
Ej ⇒ Bi
)
t
.
Fig. 1 plots these measures of connectedness computed in each
indow t, along with the corresponding conﬁdence bound. Note
hat, being all statistical tests performed with a conﬁdence level
f 5%, under the null of no-causality we expect to ﬁnd, for the
hree connectedness measures, a value around 5%. Since the con-
dence level under the null of no-causality may  be higher due to
nite-sample effects or estimation errors, we compute the conﬁ-
ence bounds for the three measures using a bootstrap procedure
escribed in Appendix D. The conﬁdence bounds of DSellt and D
Buy
t
re slightly greater than that of Dt because of the error involved in
he estimation of the VaR model and the fact that the tail-test is
uilt from a smaller statistic.
Fig. 1 witnesses an interesting empirical evidence. If we inter-
ret DSellt and D
Buy
t as, respectively, indicators of periods of
istressed selling and distressed buying, the former peaks during
he Eurozone crisis while the latter during the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial
arket crisis. This evidence suggests that the two  crises are asso-
iated with different types of ﬂight-to-quality behaviors: the ﬁrst
s characterized by a strong increase in sovereign bond purchases
hich is not accompanied by a signiﬁcant (i.e. above the corre-
ponding conﬁdence level) rise in sovereign bond selling; while
he second crisis features the contemporaneous presence of both
tatistical ﬁre-buys and ﬁre-sales of sovereign bonds.
Another interesting aspect emerging from Fig. 1 is that Dt pro-
uces a weaker signal compared to DSellt and D
Buy
t , being signiﬁcant
nly during the Eurozone crisis, and offering limited insight on the
isk propagation.
.1. An assessment of the other tail causalities
To complement the main analysis based on DSellt and D
Buy
t , we
nvestigate the structure of the Granger-causality tail risk networks
or the other six possible causal relationships: (EBuy
j
⇒ BBuy
i
)
t
;
EBuy
j
⇒ BSell
i
)
t
; (BSell
j
⇒ EBuy
i
)
t
; (BSell
j
⇒ ESell
i
)
t
; (BBuy
j
⇒ EBuy
i
)
t
;
BBuy
j
⇒ ESell
i
)
t
. Despite these relationships are of minor interest
or us, some of them reveal interesting patterns that can be used
o validate the conclusions from the main analysis.
We  use a moving window scheme to build a sequence of
ranger-causality tail risk networks with the procedure outlined
n Section 2. To be consistent with the deﬁnition of statistical ﬁre-
uys and ﬁre-sales introduced above, we say that equity buys imply
ond buys (sales) in a statistical sense. Analogously, when reverting
he causal relationship, we  say that bond sales (buys) imply equity
uys (sales) in a statistical sense.l Stability 38 (2018) 18–36
From each Granger-causality tail risk network, we  obtain a mea-
sure of connectedness analogous to those deﬁned in (5). Fig. 2
shows these measures computed in each window t. A ﬁrst interest-
ing pattern is portrayed in the right panel. Bond buy implies equity
sell in a statistical sense over the whole period of the analysis. Under
the assumption of stability of the fundamentals, this conﬁrms
that price-mediated contagion occurred both in the 2007–2008
ﬁnancial crisis and during the European debt crisis. Another inter-
esting relationships is depicted in the middle panel. This shows
that during the Eurozone crisis there was  statistically signiﬁcant
Granger-causality in tail from bond sales to equity sales. This evi-
dence is consistent with the fact that several banks suffered large
losses following the depreciation of most of the European sovereign
debts.13 For example, this was the case for Dexia, Société Générale
and BNP Paribas as they were forced to write down the value of
their Greek debt holdings. This result also reinforces our second
conclusion that during the Eurozone crisis, ﬂights-to-quality from
equity to bond went with a massive liquidation of low-rated bonds.
5. Flight-to-quality
In this section we develop our econometric measure of ﬂight-to-
quality built upon the Granger causal networks previously deﬁned.
A ﬂight-to-quality episode is commonly referred to as a conveyance
of capital from risky assets to more secure ones thus accepting
to receive lower expected returns. Such events are triggered by
particularly distressed states of the market in which the risk aver-
sion of investors may  suddenly increase. As clearly spelled out in
Anderson and Liu (Louis), [. . .]  in times of turmoil, investors accept
zero or negative nominal yields as a fee for safety.
The crucial point here is to understand which kind of quality
is sought by market players in each period, thus we  need to iden-
tify a proxy for the quality of a sovereign bond. For this analysis
we use the historical S&P’s ratings. More precisely, for each bond
in the dataset, we have at our disposal the historical S&P’s rat-
ings divided into 10 different rating classes.14 We  aggregate these
10 rating classes into two broad categories which we generically
denote as “good” and “bad” bonds. Clearly, this broad classiﬁca-
tion will depend on how strict the deﬁnition of a “good” bond is.
In order to investigate the different levels of quality requested by
the market in different periods, we consider two different deﬁni-
tions of “good” bonds. In the ﬁrst deﬁnition, that will be referred to
as the weak deﬁnition of quality, we deﬁne “good” bonds as those
with a rating between AAA and A and “bad” bonds the remain-
ing ones. The second deﬁnition, that will be referred as the strong
deﬁnition of quality, is more stringent since it classiﬁes a bond as
“good” only if the corresponding country has a AAA rating. For each
time-window t, we deﬁne the indicator function 1i ∈ Good (t) as equal
to one if bond i is rated in the “good” category and zero other-
wise. Similarly, 1i ∈ Bad (t) is the indicator function that equals one if
bond i is rated in the “bad” category in the time-window t and zero
otherwise. The deﬁnition of bad and good in the indicator func-
tions depends on the deﬁnition of quality that it is adopted. Hence,
13 This interpretation was  suggested by an anonymous referee, and we thank him
for  pointing this out.
14 Namely: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, SD (selectively defaulted on someobligations). The ﬁrst available bond price in the time stamp may  correspond to an
earlier date than the ﬁrst available rating for the same bond (see Table 4). If this is the
case, we  attach to the bond the ﬁrst available rating. The impact of this attribution
is  negligible since we  divide the bonds into two  aggregated categories according to
two  deﬁnitions of quality.
F. Corsi et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 38 (2018) 18–36 23
Fig. 1. Connectedness measures DBuyt , D
Sell
t , Dt computed as in (5) for each tth window. The dates reported in the horizontal axis correspond to the end of the time-windows
used  in the test. Horizontal lines are the bootstrapped 5% conﬁdence bounds of each measure (see Appendix D).
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cig. 2. Measures of connectedness from the other Granger-causality tail risk netw
ounds of each measure (see Appendix D).
he weak deﬁnition produces different indicator functions than the
trong one. We  then consider the four quantities,
GoodBuyt ≡
∑NEt
j=1
∑NBt
i=11
{
(Ej⇒BBuyi )t
} 1i ∈ Good (t)
NEt
∑NBt
i=1 1i ∈ Good (t)
,
GoodSellt ≡
∑NEt
j=1
∑NBt
i=11
{(
Ej⇒BSelli
)
t
} 1i ∈ Good (t)
NEt
∑NBt
i=1 1i ∈ Good (t)
,
BadBuyt ≡
∑Ne
j=1
∑Nb
i=11
{
(Ej⇒BBuyi )t
} 1i ∈ Bad (t)
NEt
∑NBt
i=1 1i ∈ Bad (t)
,
BadSellt ≡
∑Ne
j=1
∑Nb
i=11
{(
Ej⇒BSelli
)
t
} 1i ∈ Bad (t)
NEt
∑NBt
i=1 1i ∈ Bad (t)
.
(6)
For example, GoodBuyt is the average number of statistical ﬁre-
uys hitting a bond of the category “Good”. These metrics can be
nterpreted as quality-based measures of connectedness for the sta-
istical ﬁre-buys and statistical ﬁre-sales, depending on the kind of
ausal relationship adopted.omputed in each window t. Horizontal lines are the bootstrapped 5% conﬁdence
The left and right columns of Fig. 3 plot these quality-based
measures of connectedness computed in each window t for the
weak and strong deﬁnition of quality, respectively. There are two
interesting aspects that need to be emphasized. First, once we iden-
tify quality with top-rated AAA bonds (top-right panel), a surge
of statistical ﬁre-buys (black continuous line) toward good bonds
occurred during the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis and the Eurozone crisis.
This evidence is less pronounced when considering the weaker def-
inition of quality. Second, while there is scant evidence of statistical
ﬁre-sales (red dotted line in the top-right panel) toward top rated
AAA bonds, we can observe a considerable increase of statistical
ﬁre-sales during the Eurozone crisis for all the other categories (red
dotted line in the bottom-right panel).
The implications of these ﬁndings are far reaching and they sug-
gest that prominent market players did chase for quality in periods
of market distress but they did it in different ways: in the ﬁrst
phase, during the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis, they chased qual-
ity by buying sovereign debt bonds particularly of top-rated AAA
quality but also of AA and A quality and without simultaneously
massively liquidating other lower rating bonds. As a matter of fact,
only bad bonds in weak sense show a moderate amount of statis-
tical ﬁre-sales (bottom left panel). On the contrary, in the second
phase, during the 2009–2011 Eurozone crisis, investors required
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wig. 3. Quality-based measures of connectedness for statistical ﬁre-buys (black) an
ponding to the weak deﬁnition of bond quality while the right column correspond
ull  of no causality.
nly top-quality sovereign debt, i.e. the ﬂight-to-quality occurred
xclusively toward AAA-rated sovereign bonds, also at the expense
f other not-AAA-rated bonds, which were simultaneously heavily
iquidated.
Note that, the extraordinarily high number of hits toward the
AA, AA and A categories during the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis
which is manifested as the peak around mid-2008 of the black
ontinuous curve in the top-left panel of Fig. 3), is likely to be a
onsequence of a ﬂight-to-quality from toxic assets (such as sub-
rime mortgages) to highly rated sovereign debts. However, since
ur dataset does not include any of the assets that were perceived
s toxic during the subprime mortgage crisis, we cannot fully inves-
igate such type of ﬂight-to-quality.
Our analysis clearly points towards the existence of two differ-
nt types of ﬂight-to-quality: in the ﬁrst one (during the 2007–2008
nancial crisis) ﬁnancial portfolios have been signiﬁcantly rebal-
nced from risky equities and structured assets to sovereign bonds,
hile in the second one (during the 2009–2011 Eurozone crisis)
overeign bond portfolios have been rebalanced from low and
edium-rated bonds to top-rated bonds. The latter could thus
e termed a “ﬂight-to-top-quality” event. In both circumstances,
ssets’ liquidity may  also have played an important role. Under
he assumption that the assets are fully liquid and that holdings
f the banks cannot generate a considerable price impact, a bank
ill decide to rebalance its portfolio selling the assets with the high--sales (red-dotted), as deﬁned in Eq. (6). The left column reports the results corre-
e strong one. Horizontal lines are the corresponding conﬁdence bounds under the
est risk. However, we know that the sovereign bond market is not
fully liquid and, in particular, sovereign bonds with higher cred-
itworthiness are also the more liquid (Petrella and Resti, 2017).
Moreover, our analysis is based on 33 G-SIBs institutions, there-
fore we  cannot exclude possible price impacts when selling large
amounts of marketable assets. Under these conditions, the deci-
sion of which assets to liquidate ﬁrst is more complicated, either
in the case of banks pursuing a leverage target (Greenwood et al.,
2015; Cont and Schaanning, 2017) or complying with a risk-based
capital ratio constraint (Braouezec and Wagalath, 2016), and opti-
mal  liquidation rules will depend on the risk of generating liquidity
spirals following consecutive assets depreciations. These consider-
ations may  account for example for the fact that small amounts of
good quality bonds were sold during the European debt crisis while
statistical ﬁre-sales of bad bonds were mounting. The advantage of
our method is that it does not require explicitly the measurement
of liquidity to assess price-mediated contagion and the associated
systemic risk, even if we  are implicitly using a notion of liquidity
by separating the bonds into rating classes.
The hypothesis of occurrence of different ﬂight-to-quality
episodes suggested by the plots of Fig. 3 can be statistically val-
idated comparing the number of hits per category with that
expected under the null in which links from equities to bonds
are randomly assigned. The computation of these expected values
under the null is straightforward: if bonds were randomly hit by
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Fig. 4. The ﬁgure shows the proposed ﬂight-to-quality measure. Vertical lines are in correspondence of time-windows in which both PBuy
Good,t
and PSell
Bad,t
are above a threshold
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quities without any preference toward a speciﬁc category, then
he probability of observing less than NBuyGood,t hits is given by the
umulative binomial distribution
Buy
Good,t =
NBuy
Good,t∑
k=0
(
NBuyt
k
)
pkGood,t
(
1 − pGood,t
)NBuyt −k, (7)
here
Good,t =
∑NBt
i=11i ∈ Good (t)
NBt
s the probability of having a good rated bonds at time t and where
Buy
t =
∑NEt
j=1
∑NBt
i=1(Ej ⇒ B
Buy
i
)
t
, is the total number of signiﬁcant
Ej ⇒ BBuyi )t links. The computation of PSellBad,t and the other probabil-
ties follows the same rule. When the probability in (7) is larger than
 threshold p (e.g. p = 99%), it means that there is a statistically sig-
iﬁcant number of statistical ﬁre-buys toward good rated bonds. A
imilar reasoning applies for the bad rated ones and statistical ﬁre-
ales. We  identify a statistical ﬂight-to-quality when both PBuyGood,t
nd PSellBad,t exceed a large probability p simultaneously. Results of the
ight-to-quality test are reported in Fig. 4 distinguishing, as before,
etween the two deﬁnitions of good and bad bonds. The left panel
orresponds to the weak deﬁnition where good bonds are those in
he class from AAA to A, while the right panel corresponds to the
trong deﬁnition of quality where a bond is classiﬁed as good only
f the country has a AAA rating. The vertical thick lines are in cor-
espondence of the periods in which our test identiﬁes a statistical
ight-to-quality. They are distinguished into three cases, continu-
us black vertical lines correspond to p = 99%, thick red dotted lines
o p = 97.5% and thin dotted blue lines to p = 95%.
The scenario depicted by the results of Fig. 4 conﬁrms the intu-
tion that we got from the preliminary analysis inspired by the plots
n Fig. 3. Quality is required as a consequence of the turmoil and
istrust spread by the Eurozone crisis, and the phenomenon is well-
dentiﬁed if quality is deﬁned by top-quality AAA-rated bonds. In
act, with the weak deﬁnition of quality, we ﬁnd only one highly
igniﬁcant period of statistical ﬂight-to-quality after mid-2009 and
any other less signiﬁcant scattered all around the time stamp. On
he contrary, the strong deﬁnition gives a concentrated sequence
f highly signiﬁcant events around the Eurozone crisis and even
efore the beginning of 2009.tted lines and to 95% for thin dotted blue lines. The thin black curve represents the
terpretation of the references to color in this legend, the reader is referred to the
Each panel of Fig. 4 reports the arithmetic mean between PBuyGood,t
and PSellBad,t . Using a strong deﬁnition of quality, one can note that this
quantity shows an upward trend since the mid-2007, much before
the onset of the Eurozone crisis, and peaks some months before
2009, signaling the changing market conditions. We  consider this
an indicator of statistical ﬂight-to-quality that can extend the tool
kit available to a policymaker interested in the stability of the ﬁnan-
cial system. It adds valuable information, beyond those provided
by systemic-risk measures based on asset prices, indices of mar-
ket volatility, the TED spread, and other traditional measures of
ﬁnancial distress. In particular, our indicator of statistical ﬂight-
to-quality offers a unique perspective on the bank-bond system,
focusing on the causal relationship between extreme events. This
allows surveillance authorities to take targeted actions directed to
suppress moments of instability in this system.
6. Out-of-sample forecasts of bond quality
We perform an out-of-sample analysis to assess whether suit-
able centrality measures of the Granger-causality networks can be
used to predict sovereign bond quality.
6.1. Dynamic proxies of quality
We consider four proxies of sovereign bond quality that
are deﬁned “dynamically” in the sense of a continuous, time-
dependent, real variable. Agency rating are not well-suited for our
purpose because they are almost constant during time and, when
they change, they signal a huge downgrade or, more rarely, a huge
upgrade of the sovereign debt quality. For a given country, the ﬁrst
proxy is based on the correlation between the series of sovereign
bond yields and the corresponding credit default swap. A simple
absence of arbitrage argument links the spread S of CDS with the
par-yield  of a bond of the same entity. As pointed out by Hull et al.
(2004), the difference between a CDS spread and the corresponding
par-yield should equal the risk-free rate r, in formula
S =  − r. (8)
The difference between a CDS spread and the excess par-yield over
the risk-free rate, b = S − ( − r), is usually referred as the basis.
Hence, the no-arbitrage condition requires the basis to be zero. On
a large sample of companies and sovereign data, Hull et al. (2004)
ﬁnd that the no-arbitrage relationship between CDS and par-yield
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Cig. 5. Left and right panels report, respectively, the ﬁve-years maturity spread (con
nd  Germany in the period that starts in January, 1, 2007 and ends at February, 14, 2
he  web  version of the article.)
olds fairly well, with a risk-free rate slightly smaller than the swap
ate and above the Treasury rate. In our dataset15 we observe that,
specially in periods of ﬁnancial distress, such arbitrage relation-
hip could be violated, particularly for those countries whose credit
uality is commonly perceived as remarkably good.
Fig. 5 visualizes this phenomenon. The left and right panels
eport the ﬁve-years maturity CDS spread (continuous black line)
nd the corresponding ﬁve-years maturity sovereign bond yield
dotted red line) for Russia and Germany, respectively. The bond-
ield reported is the nominal par-yield after the subtraction of the
ero-coupon curve, that according to the no-arbitrage condition (8)
hould be equal to the CDS spread. The period depicted includes the
urozone crisis. The plots in Fig. 5 put in evidence that, while Rus-
ia has a CDS-bond correlation of almost 100%, in agreement with
he no-arbitrage constraint, the case of Germany is totally differ-
nt, showing even a negative CDS-bond correlation. Intuitively, CDS
preads increase during a period of crisis since investors require
igher premiums, however the behavior of bond yield can be very
ifferent according to the perceived credit quality of the country.
he case of Germany is the most striking: large capital ﬂows are
irected toward the German sovereign debt pushing downward
he level of the corresponding yield, while the CDS spread contin-
es its rise as a consequence of the generalized increase in global
redit risk. This empirical evidence has been somehow foreseen
y the past literature. In fact, price gaps among securities with
dentical cash ﬂow have been theoretically justiﬁed by the general
quilibrium model by Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011), where the
urge of the CDS-bond basis is due to negative shocks to the econ-
my  that force agents to hit their margin constraints. Moreover,
he formation of CDS-bond bases has been recently addressed as a
onsequence of ﬂight-to-quality episodes by Fontana and Scheicher
2016).
In our analysis we do not investigate the determinants of CDS-
ond bases, limiting ourselves to the ranking of bond quality
btained by using the CDS-bond correlation. In the light of the
mpirical evidences of Fig. 5 and the most recent interpretation
f the CDS-bond joint dynamics, we introduce our ﬁrst dynamical
roxy for quality of the bond i asi = 1 − Corr
[
i,t, Si,t
]
, Ci ∈ [0, 2] , (9)
15 Our dataset has almost zero time overlap with that of Hull et al. (2004).s black line) and bond yield over the zero-coupon curve (dotted red line) for Russia
(For interpretation of the references to color in this legend, the reader is referred to
where the capital letter C is introduced to remind that the qual-
ity proxy is based on the CDS-bond correlation16 coefﬁcient and
where  i,t and Si,t indicates, respectively, the series of one-lag
difference for  i,t and Si,t .
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports the country ranking accord-
ing to the quality measure Ci, computed using all observations after
the beginning of 2007. As anticipated, we observe a clear alignment
between the country and what it is intuitively expected: countries
with weak ﬁscal discipline (e.g. Spain, Italy and Portugal) stay in the
bottommost part of the table with very low values of Ci, while the
largest values are reached for countries such as Germany or Austria,
whose claims on sovereign debts are undoubtedly perceived as
more reliable. The case of Greece is not particularly signiﬁcant since
the corresponding CDS series show a very peculiar behavior, with
a diverging dynamics during the Eurozone crisis.
In order to have a multifaceted description of the bond quality,
we introduce three further measures that are obtained exclusively
using the bond yields time series. The simplest univariate mea-
sure related to bond quality is the bond yield “realized volatility”,
deﬁned as
RVi =
∑
t≥2007
(
i,t
)2
,
where  i,t indicates the daily series of the nominal bond yield for
country i. The larger the value of RVi the greater the uncertainty
about its value, hence we  expect RVi to be inversely related to
bond quality. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the second column of
Table 1, where countries are ranked according to increasing values
of RVi, with Japan being the less volatile and Greece at the end of
the ranking.
The remaining two  measures are based on yield spreads deﬁned
in the standard way, i.e. the difference between a given sovereign
bond yield and the corresponding German bond yield at the same
maturity (which is, in our applications, ﬁve years). The introduc-
tion of yield spreads in our analysis is justiﬁed by the vast literature
on the role of spreads in many aspects of the global economy. For
example, the prominent role of spreads in the European Monetary
Union as a source of risk is analyzed, much before the Eurozone
crises, by Geyer et al. (2004) with the adoption of a two-factor
model. Moreover, Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) investigate the
relationship between macro-economic policies and yield spreads.
16 Note that in Eq. (9) we are not specifying which time period is used for the two
series  i,t and Si,t , nevertheless this will become clear according to the speciﬁc
case.
F. Corsi et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 38 (2018) 18–36 27
Table  1
Ranking of country according to quality proxies.
Ci RVi S¯i SMi
1.275 Germany 0.933 Japan −2.453 Switzerland −1.054 Singapore
1.149  Australia 1.885 Switzerland −2.242 Singapore −0.855 Switzerland
1.115  Denmark 3.119 Singapore −1.828 Hong Kong 0.000 Germany
1.113  Sweden 3.832 New Zealand −1.531 Japan 0.008 Japan
1.111  Romania 4.264 Sweden −1.241 United States 0.563 Hong Kong
1.075  Czech Rep. 4.390 Finland −1.199 Finland 0.861 Netherlands
1.069  United Kingdom 4.475 Hong Kong −1.085 France 1.201 Denmark
1.062  Norway 4.643 Netherlands −0.785 Sweden 1.341 United Kingdom
1.042  United States 4.797 Denmark −0.130 Canada 1.454 Sweden
1.029  Japan 4.849 Canada −0.100 Malaysia 1.733 Norway
1.025  Singapore 4.886 Norway 0.000 Germany 1.910 Canada
1.004  Bulgaria 4.911 France 0.016 Slovakia 2.080 Austria
0.993  New Zealand 4.964 Poland 0.178 Denmark 2.095 United States
0.976  Finland 5.079 Czech Rep. 0.208 Italy 2.115 Finland
0.967  Hong Kong 5.105 Germany 0.238 Netherlands 2.129 France
0.959  Canada 5.170 United Kingdom 0.404 Austria 2.374 Slovakia
0.944  Switzerland 5.171 Austria 0.509 United Kingdom 2.411 Czech Rep.
0.937  Malaysia 6.325 Croatia 0.588 Poland 2.622 Malaysia
0.936  Turkey 6.442 Belgium 0.700 Bulgaria 3.097 New Zealand
0.885  Netherlands 7.187 Slovakia 0.700 Belgium 3.121 Poland
0.880  Slovakia 8.343 Australia 0.767 Czech Rep. 3.703 Italy
0.846  Hungary 8.436 United States 0.874 Norway 3.792 Australia
0.777  Poland 9.072 Malaysia 1.012 New Zealand 4.103 Belgium
0.746  Greece 10.803 Slovenia 1.680 Spain 5.044 Bulgaria
0.705  Austria 14.926 Italy 1.854 Slovenia 5.640 Slovenia
0.645  Croatia 15.161 Spain 2.300 Portugal 6.561 Croatia
0.642  Cyprus 21.824 Hungary 2.383 Russia 6.705 Russia
0.591  France 23.646 Russia 2.415 Australia 6.981 Spain
0.553  Slovenia 27.438 Ireland 2.484 Ireland 8.790 Hungary
0.544  Russia 68.692 Portugal 2.849 Hungary 9.939 Romania
0.369  Belgium 70.947 Venezuela 2.934 Croatia 14.043 Ireland
0.339  Ireland 71.989 Romania 3.940 Cyprus 15.454 Cyprus
0.337  Venezuela 85.221 Turkey 3.994 Romania 16.812 Portugal
0.327  Portugal 88.153 Bulgaria 7.974 Turkey 18.306 Venezuela
0.249  Italy 108.341 Cyprus 9.040 Venezuela 19.843 Turkey
0.220  Spain 846.110 Greece 11.406 Greece 55.484 Greece
Note: Each of the four panels contains the ranking of all countries according to the corresponding variable reported in the column label. Each variable is computed using all
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Sata  available after 2007. More precisely, Ci is deﬁned as 1 − i where i is the sam
ecreasing order). RVi is the realized volatility of bond yield variations. S¯i and SMi a
he  German bond, respectively.
heir empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm that changes in interest rates affect
he risk-aversion of investors producing a signiﬁcant impact on
ield spreads. Global spreads and ﬁscal fundamentals of the euro
rea are used to proxy expected exchange rate devaluation in an
conometric model for euro area spread by Favero (2013). De Santis
2014) identiﬁes a ﬂight-to-liquidity premium as the only factor
hat explains the sovereign spreads for countries with low credit
isk such as Netherlands and Finland.
The yield spread is formally deﬁned as si,t =  i,t − GER,t, where
GER,t is the bond yield for Germany. The spread-based measures
hat we adopt are the average and the maximum spread after
anuary, 1, 2007, deﬁned as
¯
i =
1
Ni
∑
t≥2007
si,t , and SMi = max
t≥2007
si,t ,
ith Ni the number of observations for the ith series. Note that,
s for RVi, the spread-based measures are expected to be inversely
elated to quality. This is conﬁrmed by the third and fourth columns
f Table 1 where, typically, we observe countries like Greece or
ortugal with the highest values of the spread-based measures and
witzerland, Singapore and Netherlands among the lowest ones.17
17 Germany has trivially a zero value for all these spread-based measures.rrelation between the sovereign bond yield and the CDS spread (and it is plotted in
 mean and maximum value of the spread between the bond of the ith country and
6.2. Out-of-sample cross-sectional regressions
We perform out-of-sample regressions that follow, in spirit, the
approach proposed in Billio et al. (2012). For a given time-window
t and a given sovereign bond i, we  deﬁne the three centrality mea-
sures,
HSelli,t ≡
1
NEt
NEt∑
j=1
1{(
Ej⇒BSelli
)
t
}, HBuy
i,t
≡ 1
NEt
NEt∑
j=1
1{(
Ej⇒BBuyi
)
t
},
Hi,t ≡
1
NEt
NEt∑
j=1
1{
(Ej⇒Bi)t
}, (10)
which, in network terms, are the degrees of the ith bond node.
The economic interpretation of HSelli,t and H
Buy
i,t
is straightforward.
The index HSelli,t (resp. H
Buy
i,t
) is the percentage of signiﬁcant causal
links (Ej ⇒ BSelli ) (resp. (Ej ⇒ B
Buy
i
)) coming from the equity side
of the network that hit the ith bond in the time-window t. Large
values of HSelli,t (resp. H
Buy
i,t
) are expected when the ith bond has
experienced several large losses (resp. gains) in the tth window,
after a considerable equity drop of a large sub-sample of the 33
systemically relevant banks. The economic interpretation of Hi,t is
less direct, since it is expression of causality relationships in mean.
Nevertheless, we include it in the analysis for comparison purposes.
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Fig. 6. Nested models comparison with dependent variable Ci,t . This ﬁgure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, . . .,  99 ending at day et (reported in the horizontal axis), the
t-statistic of ˇt in (13) where the dependent variable Yi,t is the ranking of the variable C
H
i,t deﬁned in (11) and computed in the forecasting horizon (et, et + h], with h = 360.
Each  column corresponds to a different regressor Xi,t in (13). More precisely, Xi,t = HSelli,t for the ﬁrst, Xi,t = H
Buy
i,t
for the second and Xi,t = Hi,t for the third. A black point is
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based on the bond-CDS correlation. Black points mark the regres-
sions outperforming the baseline speciﬁcation in (12) according to
the Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test.eported  whenever the regression (13) is signiﬁcantly better (according to a stand
ed  dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% conﬁdence level of the standard Norm
eferred to the web  version of the article.)
We  adapt the deﬁnitions of the four quality proxies introduced
bove in order to perform genuine out-of-sample forecasts. For
his purpose, we dynamically compute the quality proxies over a
oving window (t, t + h] with h the number of days ahead over
hich the forecast is performed. Then, the four quality proxies are
ynamically restated as
Ci,t+h = 1 − Corr[i, Si]t:t+h,
RVi,t+h =
t+h∑
	=t
(
i,	
)2
,
S¯i,t+h =
1
h
t+h∑
	=t
si,	 ,
SMi,t+h = max
	 ∈ (t,t+h]
si,	 .
(11)
Similarly to what it is done in Billio et al. (2012), in order to
itigate the effect of outliers (see, for example, the case of Greece
n Table 1), we switch to the rankings of those measures introduc-
ng calligraphic notation for all the variables involved. For example
Sell
i,t
indicates the ranking of HSelli,t in the tth time-window, S¯i,t will
ndicate the ranking of S¯i,t , and so on.
The out-of-sample regressions that we run are designed to test
f, especially in periods of distress, the cross-sectional rankings of
he bond quality proxies can be predicted by past network cen-
rality measures. Since each of the dynamical proxies of quality
s expected to be persistent (or strongly persistent in the case of
ealized volatility) it is important, to avoid spurious results, to
nclude the lagged value of the dependent variable in the forecast-
ng regression. It is also important to stress that, at any point in
ime, the regressors (i.e. the centrality measures (10) and the lagged
ependent variable) and the dependent variables (one of the quality
roxies (11)) are computed over time windows that do not overlap.
ore precisely, the regressors are computed on the past time hori-
on (t − h, t] for the lagged dependent variable, and using the three
ears preceding t for the network centrality measures. The regres-
ors are indicated with the subscript t, while the chosen dependent
ariable (i.e. one among the four quality proxies) is calculated over
he forecasting period (t, t + h] and denoted with the subscript t + h.In our analysis we adopt a twofold strategy. First, for every t, we
un the two nested cross-sectional regressions
i,t+h = K (1) + ˛t Yi,t + ε
(1)
i
(12)test with 95% conﬁdence) than the simple auto-regressive model (12). Horizontal
tribution. (For interpretation of the references to color in this legend, the reader is
and
Yi,t+h = K (2) + ˛t Yi,t + ˇt Xi,t + ε(2)i , (13)
where Yi,t is the ranking of one among Ci,t, RVi,t, S¯i,t and SMi,t
deﬁned in (11), while the independent variable Xi,t is the rank-
ing of one among the centrality measures deﬁned in (10). In this
setting, we  are testing whether the addition of the network-based
systemically relevant variable Xi,t in (13) is improving the simple
auto-regression (12).
The second approach consists in comparing, for a given proxy of
the ith bond quality Yi,t+h computed in the forecasting horizon (t,
t + h], the forecasting ability of past values of the dependent variable
itself against that of the systemic risk variables. For a given t we then
compare the cross-sectional regression (12) with a new regression
where the lagged dependent variable is substituted by one of the
systemic relevant variables, that is
Yi,t+h = K (2)
′ + ˇ′t Xi,t + ε(2)
′
i
. (14)
For this regression we  compute the t-statistics of ˇ′t and the p-value
of the Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test.18 Since, as mentioned
before, the dependent variables Yi,t are typically persistent, we
expect that only in some peculiar periods the systemic relevant
variates over-perform the past values of Yi,t in forecasting future
values of Yi,t+h.
6.3. Results
Regression results for h = 360 are depicted in Figs. 6–10.19 In par-
ticular, Figs. 6–9 report the t-statistics of the regression coefﬁcient
ˇt in (13) for the regressions with dependent variable, Ci,t , RVi,t ,
SMi,t , and S¯i,t respectively. Black points are in correspondence of
the regressions in which, according to a standard F-test with 95%
conﬁdence, the addition of Xi,t signiﬁcantly improves the simple
auto-regressive model (12). Fig. 10 reports the t-statistic of ˇ′t in
(14) obtained when the dependent variable is the quality proxy18 The test is two-sided and it is designed to be around 100% when model (12)
outperforms model (14) and around 0% the other way round.
19 Results with different h are similar and available upon request.
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Fig. 7. Nested models comparison with dependent variable RVi,t . This ﬁgure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, . . .,  99 ending at day et (reported in the horizontal axis), the
t-statistic of ˇt in (13) where the dependent variable Yi,t is the ranking of the variable RV
H
i,t deﬁned in (11) and computed in the forecasting horizon (et, et + h], with h = 360.
Each  column corresponds to a different regressor Xi,t in (13). More precisely, Xi,t = HSelli,t for the ﬁrst, Xi,t = H
Buy
i,t
for the second and Xi,t = Hi,t for the third. A black point is
reported whenever the regression (13) is signiﬁcantly better (according to a standard F-test with 95% conﬁdence) than the simple auto-regressive model (12). Horizontal
red  dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% conﬁdence level of the standard Normal distribution. (For interpretation of the references to color in this legend, the reader is
referred to the web  version of the article.)
Fig. 8. Nested models comparison with dependent variable SMi,t . This ﬁgure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, . . .,  99 ending at day et (reported in the horizontal axis), the
t-statistic of ˇt in (13) where the dependent variable Yi,t is the ranking of the variable SM
H
i,t deﬁned in (11) and computed in the forecasting horizon (et, et + h], with h = 360.
Each  column corresponds to a different regressor Xi,t in (13). More precisely, Xi,t = HSelli,t for the ﬁrst, Xi,t = H
Buy
i,t
for the second and Xi,t = Hi,t for the third. A black point is
reported whenever the regression (13) is signiﬁcantly better (according to a standard F-test with 95% conﬁdence) than the simple auto-regressive model (12). Horizontal
red  dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% conﬁdence level of the standard Normal distribution. (For interpretation of the references to color in this legend, the reader is
referred to the web  version of the article.)
Fig. 9. Nested models comparison with dependent variable S¯i,t . This ﬁgure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, . . ., 99 ending at day et (reported in the horizontal axis), the
t-statistic of ˇt in (13) where the dependent variable Yi,t is the ranking of the variable S¯i,t deﬁned in (11) and computed in the forecasting horizon (et, et + h], with h = 360.
Each  column corresponds to a different regressor Xi,t in (13). More precisely, Xi,t = HSelli,t for the ﬁrst, Xi,t = H
Buy
i,t
for the second and Xi,t = Hi,t for the third. A black point is
reported whenever the regression (13) is signiﬁcantly better (according to a standard F-test with 95% conﬁdence) than the simple auto-regressive model (12). Horizontal
red  dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% conﬁdence level of the standard Normal distribution. (For interpretation of the references to color in this legend, the reader is
referred to the web  version of the article.)
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Fig. 10. Non-nested models comparison with dependent variable Ci,t . This ﬁgure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, . . .,  99 ending at day et (reported in the horizontal axis),
the  t-statistic of ˇ′t in (14) where the dependent variable Yi,t is the ranking of the variable C
H
i,t deﬁned in (11) and computed in the forecasting horizon (et, et + h], with h = 360.
Each  column corresponds to a different regressor Xi,t in (14). More precisely, Xi,t = HSelli,t for the ﬁrst, Xi,t = H
Buy
i,t
for the second and Xi,t = Hi,t for the third. A black point is
reported  whenever the regression (14) is signiﬁcantly better (according to the log-likelihood ratio test of Vuong (1989) with 95% conﬁdence) than the simple auto-regressive
model  (12). Horizontal red dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% conﬁdence level of the standard Normal distribution. (For interpretation of the references to color in
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The results can be summarized in three main empirical ﬁnd-
ngs. First, the black points in Fig. 6 document a signiﬁcant negative
mpact of HSell
i,t
on future values of the CDS-bond correlation rank-
ngs. This means that the bond quality ranked according to Ci is, in
eriod of ﬁnancial distress, signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the intensity
f statistical ﬁre-sales experienced by the bond in the past years.
he negative sign is in agreement with the idea that high values
f Ci correspond to a better quality for the bond (see Table 1). On
he contrary, statistical ﬁre-buys have no inﬂuence on future val-
es of Ci. Moreover, as for the results in Fig. 1, the regressions for
i,t are roughly in agreement with those of the statistical ﬁre-sale
ndicator. The non-nested analysis reported in Fig. 10 corroborates
he results of Fig. 6, with the intriguing implication that, during
eriods of ﬁnancial turmoil, systemic variables are more informa-
ive than past values of quality measures in predicting the future
uality of the bonds. Second, the realized volatility of bond yields
s positively and signiﬁcantly impacted by HSell
i,t
, particularly during
he Eurozone crisis, and by Hi,t . The statistical ﬁre-buy indicator
Buy
i,t
shows a noisier behavior, even if it tends to show a negative
ign when signiﬁcant (as intuitively expected) over most part of
he sample (turning positive only in the ﬁnal periods). Third, the
aximum spread is largely inﬂuenced by HSell
i,t
for the entire period
f the Eurozone crisis and even later.
Summing up, the connectedness measures obtained from the
ranger-causality tail risk network of statistical ﬁre-sales have a
trong impact on the future values of the bond quality, and they add
tatistically insightful information beyond that provided by classi-
al risk indicators such as the realized volatility of the bond’s yield,
he CDS-bond correlation, and the yield spread.
. Conclusions
We  introduced an econometric method designed to detect and
nalyze periods of ﬁnancial distress based on events of extraordi-
ary nature. We  use the test of Granger-causality in tail of Hong
t al. (2009) to build Granger-causality tail risk networks between
quity log-returns of 33 systemically relevant banks and govern-
ent bond yield variations for 36 countries around the world. We
erive measures of centrality for these networks that we  econom-
cally interpret, under the assumption of stable fundamentals, as
ndicators of statistical ﬁre-buys and statistical ﬁre-sales. Exploit-ing the information of S&P country ratings, our empirical analysis
evidences that, during the turbulent period of the Eurozone crisis,
the sovereign bond market has been impacted by investors chas-
ing for quality. More speciﬁcally, top-quality bonds have incurred
in large negative variations of their yields (price increases), and
this happened with a simultaneous dramatic loss of value for the
large part of non-AAA-rated bonds. Besides, statistical ﬁre-buys
toward AAA-rated bonds largely occurred during the subprime
mortgages crisis. Although, we do not have speciﬁc information
on assets which were classiﬁed as toxic during the 2007 ﬁnancial
crisis, it is very likely that the surge of the statistical ﬁre-buy index
for AAA-rated bonds is due to ﬂight-to-quality episodes from the
stock market to the government bond market. The interpretation
of our results is multifaceted and connected to those of Baur and
Lucey (2009). While the results of Baur and Lucey (2009) docu-
ment the appearance of ﬂight-to-quality from stocks (indexes) and
bonds (indexes) on several countries (and also on contagion among
countries) during major ﬁnancial crises, we  put the focus on ﬂight-
to-quality within the sovereign bond markets and from stocks
of major ﬁnancial banks to highly-rated sovereign bonds. Most
importantly, as mentioned in the Introduction, in our economet-
ric framework it is not necessary to know the temporal positioning
of the ﬁnancial crises ab initio, since crises are automatically iden-
tiﬁed by the simultaneous occurrence of large equity drops for a
considerable fraction of the systemically relevant banks.
Finally, adopting different dynamic proxies of bond quality
allows us to test whether the centrality measures can predict the
ranking of creditworthiness of the sovereign bonds. The indicator
of statistical ﬁre-sale has signiﬁcant explanatory power in forecast-
ing future values of the correlation between CDS spreads and the
bond yield of a country, of the yield realized volatility and of the
maximum spread with respect to the German bond. The behavior of
the centrality measure based on the original Granger (1969) causal-
ity, although with a reduced forecasting power, is in line with the
indicator of statistical ﬁre-sale. In summary, we  show that it is pos-
sible, during periods of crises, to improve the forecast of the future
(perceived) quality ranking of sovereign bonds. We  believe that
this is an appealing feature of our measures, since they could pro-
vide insightful information to surveillance authorities in the very
moment their intervention is needed for the ﬁnancial stability of
the sovereign debt market.
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Table  2
Parameter estimates of the model (16) for daily time series of sovereign bond yield variations.
Country Bond
AUSTL BUL CAN SWI  CZH DNK AUSTR BEL CRO CYP FIN FRA
ˇ1 0.0031 0.0243 0.0002 −0.0007 0.0028 0.0014 0.0026 0.0028 0.0106 0.0002 0.0014 0.0019
(0.08)  (0.00) (0.38) (0.22) (0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.02) (0.06) (0.39) (0.08) (0.09)
ˇ2 0.9297 0.7972 0.9537 0.9357 0.8969 0.9391 0.9003 0.9016 0.7174 0.9215 0.9405 0.9046
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ˇ3 0.0424 0.7558 0.0734 0.1573 0.1477 0.0901 0.1785 0.2220 0.3821 0.2101 0.0969 0.1876
(0.21)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
ˇ4 0.1440 − 0.2136 0.1125 0.1711 0.1952 0.1020 0.1256 0.0927 0.4085 0.1415 0.0952 0.1379
(0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.24) (0.05) (0.06)
DQ  0.88 0.58 0.51 0.20 0.99 0.69 0.75 0.54 0.70 0.90 0.58 0.79
GER  GRE HUN IRE ITA NET POL POR SLO SPA SLK UK
ˇ1 0.0017 0.0004 0.0052 0.0017 0.0016 0.0017 0.0013 −0.0024 0.0001 0.0014 0.0016 0.0013
(0.08)  (0.43) (0.00) (0.25) (0.18) (0.02) (0.08) (0.25) (0.35) (0.03) (0.19) (0.16)
ˇ2 0.9349 0.9278 0.8508 0.8015 0.8014 0.9354 0.9256 0.8605 0.9748 0.8865 0.9021 0.9599
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ˇ3 0.0901 0.1826 0.2208 0.4397 0.5718 0.1031 0.1151 0.4621 0.0790 0.3688 0.2008 0.0389
(0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
ˇ4 0.1176 0.1140 0.2128 0.4085 0.2498 0.0932 0.1318 0.2358 0.0258 0.0885 0.1690 0.0775
(0.01)  (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
DQ  0.08 0.47 0.08 0.75 0.55 0.92 0.18 0.61 0.71 0.90 0.88 0.79
HK  JAP MAL  NOR NZ ROM SWED SGP TUR RUS US VEN
ˇ1 0.0004 0.0005 0.0554 0.0002 0.0106 0.0033 0.0017 0.0042 0.0082 0.0039 0.0018 0.2404
(0.28)  (0.05) (0.00) (0.45) (0.02) (0.20) (0.03) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.14) (0.04)
ˇ2 0.9357 0.9299 − 0.0764 0.9317 0.7891 0.8200 0.9425 0.8710 0.8486 0.8582 0.9129 0.4235
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
ˇ3 0.1028 0.2147 0.9976 0.0791 0.1304 0.4692 0.0308 0.1947 0.2900 0.2873 0.1596 0.1854
(0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.18) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.02) (0.09)
ˇ4 0.1472 0.0396 0.0320 0.2060 0.3472 0.3354 0.1366 0.1545 0.3157 0.2392 0.1321 0.4561
(0.00)  (0.06) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)
DQ  0.10 0.96 0.51 0.93 0.03 0.13 0.32 0.99 0.82 0.67 0.51 0.65
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time grid, Yi,t is either the series of bond yield variations or the
20 This choice does not affect country whose series is not available before January,ote: Sovereign bonds are indicated by the corresponding country acronym. For ea
han  1% are reported in bold. The DQ-test is the p-value of the Dynamical Quantile te
hat  the model (16) ﬁts the data is rejected with a conﬁdence of 1%.
ppendix A. Time-adapted CAViaR
We  ﬁrst review the CAViaR estimation method introduced by
ngle and Manganelli (2004). Given a time series
{
Yt
}T
t=1 the condi-
ional Value-at-Risk is the time series
{
V (˛)t
}T
t=1
implicitly deﬁned
y the equation
 = Prob
[
Yt < −V (˛)t |It−1
]
. (15)
The quantile regression developed by Engle and Manganelli
2004) allows for the estimation of any parametric model for V (˛)t .
n testing tail risk spillovers among ﬁnancial time series, Hong et al.
2009) adopt the asymmetric slope model that speciﬁes V (˛)t as
(˛)
t = ˇ1 + ˇ2 V (
˛)
t−1 + ˇ3 Y+t−1 + ˇ4 Y−t−1, (16)
here the dependence of the ˇ’s from  ˛ has been omitted to ease
he notation and where the Y+t−1 (resp. Y
−
t−1) denotes the positive
resp. negative) part. Volatility clustering implies that a strongly
ositive signiﬁcant ˇ2 is expected. Concerning ˇ3 and ˇ4 they
eﬁne, respectively, the impact of positive and negative returns
n future Value-at-Risk. Models such that reported in Eq. (16)
re estimated in Engle and Manganelli (2004) through a quantile
egression. In estimating model (16) on equity and bond returns
e adopt the same procedure as well (see Section 6 of Engle and
anganelli, 2004 for more details). For our purposes, however, we
ave to take particular care since we are aimed at producing fully-
ausal time series of conditional Value-at-Risk of equity and bonds.
ence we have to ﬁx two main issues. First, we  want to have time
eries that are comparable with each other and then we have toe report in brackets the corresponding p-value. Parameters with a p-value smaller
ngle and Manganelli (2004). A value of the test below 1% means that the hypothesis
mitigate the asynchronicity due to the different time zones of the
countries in our dataset. Second, having in mind a Granger-type
analysis, at each point in time only past information should be used
to produce the Value-at-Risk estimates.
We  start our procedure with a “training” window of six years.
More precisely, to compute the initial value of the VaR time series,
we use a window starting in tstart = January, 1, 2001 and ending at
t(0)end = January, 1, 2006.20 Then, for a given series either of equity
log-returns or of bond yield variations, we estimate the model of Eq.
(16). Hence, the ﬁnal date t(0)end is shifted by one month producing a
new ﬁnal date t(1)end = t
(0)
end + 1 month and the estimation procedure,
now using data from tstart up to t
(1)
end is repeated. The generic nth
time window is thus formed using data from tstart up to t
(n)
end ≡ t
(0)
end +
n months. The procedure is iterated over n until the end of the time
stamp is reached, that is when the shifted ﬁnal date t(n)end occurs after
February, 14, 2014, which is the last available day for all time series
in the dataset.
The outcome of the procedure is the set of ZB
i,t
=
1{
(˛)
(
ˆ
)} series where t spans across the 2-days1,  2006. In fact, before proceeding to the estimation of the CAViaR model, we require
that at least 100 (daily) observations of the series are present. This limitation is
required since we initialize the CAViaR estimation with the ﬁrst 10% of the series,
hence a reasonable number of observations must be present in order to have a
reliable estimate of V (˛)0 in (16).
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Table 3
Parameter estimates of the model (16) for the daily time series of equity log-returns of the 33 systemically important ﬁnancial institutions.
Equity Ticker
DEXB CS UBS CBK DB SAN BBVA ACA GLE BNP RBS
ˇ1 0.0043 0.0010 0.0006 0.0015 0.0014 0.0006 0.0014 0.0005 0.0011 0.0009 0.0008
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
ˇ2 0.7899 0.9032 0.9264 0.8597 0.8689 0.9290 0.8666 0.9429 0.9102 0.9083 0.9302
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ˇ3 0.1022 0.0806 0.0412 0.1245 0.1011 0.0054 0.1179 0.0419 0.0460 0.0435 0.0344
(0.00) (0.05) (0.29) (0.04) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.21)
ˇ4 0.4882 0.2532 0.2132 0.3574 0.3807 0.2421 0.3275 0.1576 0.2658 0.2760 0.2037
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DQ  0.64 0.96 0.79 0.80 0.50 0.63 0.83 0.60 0.84 0.58 0.67
STAN  HSBC LLOY BCS UCG NDA RF COF GS JPM AXP
ˇ1 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 0.0013 0.0002 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0005
(0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.20) (0.01) (0.06) (0.25) (0.00) (0.01) (0.12) (0.06)
ˇ2 0.8889 0.8446 0.9483 0.9335 0.9213 0.8503 0.9182 0.9011 0.8868 0.9197 0.8934
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ˇ3 0.1079 0.1907 −0.0315 0.0202 0.0456 0.1703 0.0938 0.0512 0.1250 0.0933 0.1225
(0.15) (0.00) (0.04) (0.34) (0.21) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00)
ˇ4 0.2857 0.4594 0.2205 0.2228 0.2109 0.3449 0.2214 0.2732 0.2981 0.1627 0.2832
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.00)
DQ  0.91 0.94 0.57 0.26 0.37 0.95 0.75 0.93 0.75 0.56 0.64
BBT  BAC BK C FITB MS PNC STT STI USB  WFC
ˇ1 0.0003 0.0015 0.0008 0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 0.0001 0.0012 0.0004 0.0001 −0.0000
(0.17) (0.07) (0.03) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.11) (0.42) (0.50)
ˇ2 0.9034 0.8398 0.9158 0.9072 0.9498 0.8991 0.9068 0.8554 0.9100 0.8396 0.9086
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ˇ3 0.1074 0.1337 0.0558 0.0483 0.0055 0.0588 0.0718 0.0979 0.0557 0.1839 0.1065
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.19) (0.44) (0.05) (0.24) (0.17) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00)
ˇ4 0.3119 0.4188 0.2209 0.2843 0.1541 0.3133 0.3566 0.3985 0.2872 0.5056 0.2978
(0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DQ  0.23 0.70 0.61 0.15 0.96 0.86 0.71 0.66 0.87 0.93 0.22
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iote: Equities are indicated by the corresponding ticker. For each  ˇ we  report in bra
n  bold. The DQ-test is the p-value of the Dynamical Quantile test of Engle and Mang
ts the data is rejected with a conﬁdence of 1%.
eries of equity log-returns, V (˛)
i,t
(
ϑˆi
)
is the series of the estimated
alue-at-Risk of Yi,t, and ϑˆi = {ˇi, i = 1, . . .,  4} is the parameter
ector. We  stress that, as mentioned in Section 4, while all the
nformation available up to t(n)end is used to estimate the parametric
odel (16), all networks of Granger causalities are formed only
ith data in the three years prior to t(n)end, where the choice of three
ears is a trade-off between the power of the causality tests and
he necessity of isolating periods of ﬁnancial distress.
In Tables 2 and 3 we report the estimated ˇ’s and the corre-
ponding p-value (in brackets) for, respectively, the 36 sovereign
ebt bonds and the 33 systemically important ﬁnancial institutions
n our dataset, estimated using the entire time span. Numbers in
old identify 99% signiﬁcant parameters. The adequacy of the ﬁt
s measured by the p-value of the dynamical quantile (DQ) test of
ngle and Manganelli (2004) reported in Tables 2 and 3 for each
ime series.21
ppendix B. Summary statistics
This Appendix reports the summary statistics of the three blocks
f data as introduced in Section 3.
Table 4 shows a summary statistics of the series of bond
ield variations used for the construction of the causal network.
oreover, for each country we add the information coming from
21 A p-value below 0.01 means that the hypothesis that model (16) is the true DGP
s  rejected with 99% conﬁdence. the corresponding p-value. Parameters with a p-value smaller than 1% are reported
 (2004). A value of the test below 1% means that the hypothesis that the model (16)
historical S&P long-term foreign currency ratings that is explicitly
used in the ﬂight-to-quality analysis of Section 5.
Similarly, Table 5 reports a summary statistics for the time series
of equity log-returns, which, typically, are available for longer time
periods. As for the bond series, all equity series end at February, 14,
2014. Note that in both Tables 4 and 5 the number of observations
refers to the number of bond yield variations or equity log-returns
in a two-days sub-sampled grid, and thus it is typically half of what
it is expected from a daily time series. As anticipated in the main
text, the sub-sampling is required in order to mitigate the effect of
non-synchronous data (equities and bonds may  refer to banks or
countries that pertain to different parts of the world).
A third block of data is formed by CDS spreads. This part of
the dataset is extensively adopted in Section 6.1 to deﬁne quality
measures that are suitable for the proposed out-of-sample fore-
cast exercise and that are (at least by construction) independent
from the S&P country ratings. Table 6 reports a summary statistics
for the CDS spread dataset. It is worth to mention that, despite all
bond and equity series end at February, 14, 2014 (even if the start-
ing date may  vary from series to series), all CDS spread series end
mostly at January, 13, 2014, with few exceptions. Moreover, while
the summaries for bonds and equities in Tables 4 and 5 are related
to one-lag differences (or log-differences) on a two-days subsam-
pled grid, the summary for CDS spread is relative to the original
daily grid. This is because, for a given country, the corresponding
CDS spreads are used in Section 6.1 for the construction of a mea-
sure of bond quality in connection with the bond yield of the same
country, hence there are no issues related to non-synchronicity of
data. In this case we also rely on the original daily grid for bond
yields as well.
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Table  4
Summary statistics for ﬁve-years maturity sovereign bond yield variations.
Country #Obs First Yield First Rating Mean Std Kurt Skew Rat. Initial Rat. Final
Australia 1707 18-Dec-2000 30-Apr-2003 −0.0011614 0.086692 4.1985 0.10344 AAA AAA
Bulgaria 918 17-Jan-2007 28-Feb-2001 −0.0021423 0.26788 11.4813 −0.025379 BB BBB
Canada 1563 06-Feb-2002 01-Jan-2003 −0.0018417 0.070579 5.061 0.15631 AAA AAA
Switzerland 912 05-Feb-2007 05-Jun-2007 −0.0025198 0.048724 11.7672 −0.97995 AAA AAA
Czech Rep. 1707 22-Dec-2000 26-Feb-2001 −0.0032534 0.072267 13.8517 −0.12909 AA AA
Denmark 1707 18-Dec-2000 26-Nov-2002 −0.0024144 0.066528 4.6618 0.19488 AAA AAA
Austria 1707 18-Dec-2000 29-May-2001 −0.0022451 0.069703 8.0128 0.14315 AAA AA
Belgium 1707 18-Dec-2000 31-Jan-2001 −0.0021455 0.079765 17.4321 −0.28795 AA AA
Croatia 1707 23-Feb-1999 04-Jan-2001 −0.0013913 0.073417 12.5473 0.81739 A BBB
Cyprus 1248 08-Jul-2004 01-Feb-2002 0.00288 0.2969 87.3243 2.2977 A BB
Finland 1044 31-Jan-2006 23-Apr-2001 −0.0022283 0.068877 4.6478 −0.0046261 AAA AAA
France 1044 31-Jan-2006 12-Apr-2002 −0.002152 0.072982 6.0037 −0.17405 AAA AA
Germany 1707 21-Dec-2000 02-Jul-2002 −0.0022529 0.068445 4.661 0.09215 AAA AAA
Greece 1249 05-Jul-2004 02-Jan-2001 −0.0019649 0.87615 20.659 0.86456 AA CC
Hungary 1707 26-Jan-1999 28-Feb-2001 −0.00073451 0.12418 127.6168 7.0949 A BB
Ireland 1707 12-Jan-1999 01-Jan-2003 −0.0016136 0.14665 37.0698 −1.4267 AA BBB
Italy  1050 12-Jan-2006 31-Jan-2001 −0.00060661 0.13384 17.3076 −0.59019 AA BBB
Netherlands 1707 19-Dec-2000 31-Jul-2003 −0.0021168 0.066599 4.6625 0.13765 AAA AAA
Poland 1437 27-Jan-2003 04-Jan-2001 −0.0016577 0.071337 26.6904 2.2572 BBB A
Portugal 899 13-Mar-2007 07-Feb-2002 2.3583e−05 0.31568 25.2 0.29047 AA BB
Slovenia 1707 22-Dec-2000 26-Apr-2001 −0.00095375 0.095164 46.5957 3.0981 A A
Spain  1707 21-Dec-2000 31-Jan-2001 −0.0014353 0.11052 17.1361 −1.0718 AA BBB
Slovakia 1260 04-Jun-2004 24-May-2001 −0.0026884 0.071821 12.7855 0.29499 BBB A
United Kingdom 1707 21-Dec-2000 27-Oct-2004 −0.001923 0.068336 5.2821 −0.00094986 AAA AAA
Hong  Kong 1036 22-Feb-2006 02-Jul-2002 −0.0026838 0.070906 6.4891 0.33106 A AAA
Japan  1707 21-Dec-2000 04-Jan-2001 −0.00044238 0.034059 8.13 0.5942 AA AA
Malaysia 885 19-Apr-2007 23-Apr-2001 0.00050054 0.099712 245.6309 −0.70101 BBB A
Norway 1707 27-Dec-2000 24-Oct-2003 −0.0021842 0.074505 7.0371 0.06374 AAA AAA
New  Zealand 892 02-Apr-2007 31-Jul-2003 −0.0025713 0.070055 5.8272 0.10122 AA AA
Romania 912 02-Feb-2007 11-Feb-2002 −0.0024293 0.22238 39.5595 0.066911 B BB
Sweden 1201 17-Nov-2004 04-Jan-2001 −0.001455 0.065942 6.4749 −0.35297 AA AAA
Singapore 943 08-Nov-2006 18-Jul-2003 −0.0016856 0.061072 10.2324 0.57176 AAA AAA
Turkey 1209 25-Oct-2004 19-Jan-2001 −0.007365 0.46916 84.4745 2.0867 B BB
Russia 1707 03-Jan-2000 23-Apr-2001 −0.0076673 0.15226 23.197 0.51217 BB BBB
United States 1153 31-Mar-2005 01-Dec-2003 −0.0023223 0.089286 5.4863 0.21661 AAA AA
Venezuela 668 17-Dec-2008 26-Feb-2001 −0.0071942 0.33779 5.7275 0.13542 B B
Note: Summary statistics for the bond sample. The ﬁrst column is the name of the country. The second column indicates the total number of available observations, that is
the  total number of innovations (one-lag differences of bond yields) in the two-days sub-sampled grid. Despite the starting date may vary from series to series, the ending
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Fate  is February, 14, 2014 for all the countries. The third column is the starting date
he  ﬁrst S&P rating is available. Mean, Std, Kurt and Skew indicate, respectively, me
ample. Finally, the last two columns indicate, respectively, the initial and ﬁnal S&P
ppendix C. Granger causality
Billio et al. (2012) apply the deﬁnition of causality as originally
eﬁned by Granger (1969). Consider two time series
{
Y1,t
}T
t=1 and
Y2,t
}T
t=1 and the two regressions
Y1,t+1 = b1,1 Y1,t + εt+1
Y1,t+1 = b1,1 Y1,t + b1,2 Y2,t + t+1,
(17)
here εt+1 and t+1 are i.i.d. normal shocks (with possibly non-zero
ean). When testing the Granger (1969)-causality we  are testing
he null
0
G : E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
= E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k, Y2,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
(18)
gainst the alternative
A
G : E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
/= E
[
Y1,t |
{
Y1,t−k, Y2,t−k
}t−1
k=1
]
. (19)
e say that
{
Y2,t
}T
t=1 Granger-causes the series
{
Y1,t
}T
t=1, and we
rite (2 ⇒ 1), at a conﬁdence level  ˛ if the F-statistic of the two
egressions =
(
T∑
t=1
(
εˆ2t −  ˆ2t
)) (∑T
t=1 ˆ
2
t
T − 2
)−1e series, that is when the ﬁrst yield is available. The fourth column indicates when
andard deviation, kurtosis and skewness of the corresponding series for the entire
g.
is larger than the corresponding ˛-quantile of the F-distribution.
Note that with this deﬁnition we are not testing for simultaneous
causality. This choice is necessary in order to have a coherent com-
parison with the Q1 (M) test, which does not check for simultaneous
risk spillover.
In order to avoid spurious detections (induced by heteroskedas-
ticity) of causalities in the Granger (1969)-causality network we
follow the procedure adopted by Billio et al. (2012) and we  ﬁlter
out a GARCH(1, 1) model from data. That is, for each time series
Yi,t, we  estimate the model
{
Yi,t = i + i,t εi,t, εi,t∼N(0, 1) ,
2
i,t
= ωi + ˛i
(
Yi,t−1 − i
)2 + ˇi 2i,t−1, (20)
and then normalize each time series by re-deﬁning
Yi,t ≡
Yi,t
ˆi,t
,where ˆi,t is the estimated conditional volatility of model (20).
This ﬁltering is not required for the tail risk networks since
heteroskedasticity is, in these cases, taken into account by the para-
metric conditional Value-at-Risk model.
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Table 5
Summary statistics for equity log-returns.
Ticker #Obs First Price Mean Std Kurt Skew
DEXB 1707 07-Oct-1999 −0.0035184 0.072745 15.2732 0.079262
CS  1643 27-Jun-2001 −0.00048936 0.038509 11.2898 0.32927
UBS  1681 14-Mar-2001 −0.00043545 0.03446 11.2177 −0.079069
CBK  1707 22-Apr-1998 −0.00054483 0.03749 10.5217 −0.052093
DB  1707 22-Apr-1998 −0.0015446 0.044453 10.2787 −0.41609
SAN  1707 22-Apr-1998 −0.00033222 0.031501 6.3791 0.062805
BBVA 1707 29-Dec-1999 −0.00034258 0.032301 6.446 −0.023647
ACA  1602 22-Oct-2001 −0.00035503 0.038336 8.253 −0.09679
GLE  1707 22-Oct-1998 −0.0002281 0.041138 7.6145 −0.1066
BNP  1707 22-Oct-1998 0.00017214 0.036591 8.1942 0.050653
RBS  1707 24-Mar-1999 0.00016734 0.032294 11.1185 −0.17534
STAN 1707 04-Feb-1999 −0.00021892 0.025165 16.1126 −0.86996
HSBC 1707 02-Feb-1999 −0.0010079 0.046532 24.338 −1.4578
LLOY  1707 02-Feb-1999 −0.00033476 0.046943 26.2879 0.26912
BCS  1707 10-Dec-1998 −0.0015173 0.053786 163.7187 -7.4101
UCG  1707 19-Aug-1998 −0.00099158 0.036409 9.1553 −0.11276
NDA  1707 22-Jun-1998 0.00038478 0.02919 8.9226 0.15603
RF  1707 14-Dec-1998 0.00034582 0.032113 13.4261 0.07461
COF  1707 26-Apr-1999 −1.6519e−06 0.029675 16.539 0.56877
GS  1707 14-Dec-1998 −0.00019598 0.042239 21.9987 −0.21996
JPM  1122 27-Jun-2005 4.1355e−05 0.030608 11.4117 −0.38165
AXP  1707 27-Apr-1999 6.3366e−05 0.043883 16.9162 −0.50853
BBT  1707 14-Dec-1998 −0.0013513 0.045729 21.7681 −0.57551
BAC  1707 18-Jun-1999 −0.00061847 0.052349 69.6301 2.3045
BK  1707 15-Jun-1999 0.00025387 0.032615 10.7813 −0.1228
C  1707 10-May-2000 0.00010819 0.033869 10.7917 −0.082293
FITB  1707 15-Dec-1998 −0.00042313 0.053264 70.7717 1.4406
MS  1707 16-Jun-1999 5.7451e−05 0.035257 36.7378 −1.5176
PNC  1187 27-Dec-2004 −0.0010434 0.052744 16.4883 0.27674
STT  1707 18-Jun-1999 7.2277e−05 0.039327 58.6034 −2.9936
STI  1707 23-Oct-1998 −0.00031073 0.041151 34.4266 1.1071
USB  1707 18-Jun-1999 0.00017 0.032021 26.1179 −0.4025
WFC  1707 14-Dec-1998 0.00029344 0.03257 20.9868 −0.35808
Note: Summary statistics for the equity sample. The ﬁrst column indicates the bank ticker. The second column indicates the total number of available observations, that is
the  total number of innovations (one-lag differences of equity log-prices) in the two-days sub-sampled grid. Despite the starting date may  vary from series to series, the
ending  date is February, 14, 2014 for all the equities. The third column is the starting date of the series, that is when the ﬁrst price is available. Mean, Std, Kurt and Skew
indicate, respectively, mean, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness of the corresponding equity for the entire sample.
Fig. 11. The black (continuous), the red (dotted) and the blue (with ﬁlled circles) lines represent, respectively, the density of the percentage of 5%-signiﬁcant links according
t  over
s tracti
n  color
A
i
t
wo  the (Ej ⇒ BBuyi ), (Ej ⇒ BSelli ) and (Ej ⇒ Bi) causality test. The density is computed
et  of 33 equity log-returns and 36 bond yield variations is formed by randomly ex
ormalized to have an integral equal to one. (For interpretation of the references to
ppendix D. Monte Carlo estimation of the conﬁdence
ntervals of the centrality measuresFigs. 1 and 3 report the percentage of 5%-signiﬁcant links in
he bi-partite network of equity-bond, estimated in a rolling time-
indow of three years. In the ideal case in which the network is 1000 replications of a bootstrap procedure in which, for each replication, a new
ng with replacement 400 observations from the original time series. Densities are
 in this legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
estimated via an inﬁnite time series, both the causal test and the
estimation of the VaR model in (16) or the GARCH model in (20)
are immune by estimation errors. In this case we expect 5% of the
equity-bond couples to be validated under the null of no-causal
connections among them. In practice, ﬁniteness of the sample and
numerical errors in the estimation procedure could result in higher
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Table  6
Summary statistics for ﬁve-years maturity CDS spread variations.
Country #Obs First Obs. Last Obs. Mean Std Kurt Skew
Australia 2697 30-Apr-2003 13-Jan-2014 8.4894e−07 0.00021067 26.3281 0.51716
Bulgaria 3342 28-Feb-2001 13-Jan-2014 −1.1356e−05 0.00088362 99.5856 −2.9087
Canada 2283 11-Sep-2003 13-Jan-2014 −1.3333e−06 0.00013204 34.555 −1.851
Switzerland 1308 05-Jun-2007 13-Jan-2014 −1.9349e−06 0.00025046 41.9152 −0.89803
Czech Rep. 3251 26-Mar-2001 13-Jan-2014 1.0436e−06 0.00034909 51.6964 0.45145
Denmark 2877 26-Nov-2002 13-Jan-2014 5.9399e−07 0.00018683 27.1692 0.44277
Austria 3295 29-May-2001 13-Jan-2014 9.8893e−07 0.00030032 37.8286 1.136
Belgium 3374 31-Jan-2001 13-Jan-2014 1.1869e−06 0.00038992 38.4293 −0.79271
Croatia 3398 04-Jan-2001 13-Jan-2014 1.792e−06 0.0007084 30.0985 −0.52374
Cyprus 2785 01-Jul-2002 13-Jan-2014 2.663e−05 0.0016567 99.2018 1.4096
Finland 2983 01-Jul-2002 13-Jan-2014 5.1689e−07 0.00011401 22.0623 0.92094
France 3061 12-Apr-2002 13-Jan-2014 1.5933e−06 0.00026709 23.924 −0.26315
Germany 2946 02-Jul-2002 13-Jan-2014 6.9075e−07 0.00014363 19.351 0.225
Greece 3036 02-Jan-2001 13-Jan-2014 0.00074927 0.02616 547.4371 13.5898
Hungary 2816 28-Feb-2001 29-Dec-2011 2.0483e−05 0.00083989 47.3315 1.7824
Ireland 2878 01-Jan-2003 13-Jan-2014 3.623e−06 0.0010063 45.6246 −0.62625
Italy  3379 31-Jan-2001 13-Jan-2014 4.3708e−06 0.0006985 26.7496 0.12638
Netherlands 2316 31-Jul-2003 13-Jan-2014 1.0806e−06 0.00019783 25.9883 1.0971
Poland 3372 04-Jan-2001 13-Jan-2014 1.0346e−06 0.00049855 35.175 0.12573
Portugal 3113 07-Feb-2002 13-Jan-2014 8.9085e−06 0.0014123 39.4631 −0.44806
Slovenia 3106 01-Feb-2002 13-Jan-2014 5.5031e−06 0.0004897 47.888 2.0997
Spain  3361 26-Feb-2001 13-Jan-2014 3.7635e−06 0.00070193 21.9508 −0.57469
Slovakia 3277 24-May-2001 13-Jan-2014 −1.9518e−06 0.00035572 31.4529 1.2219
United Kingdom 1991 20-Mar-2006 13-Jan-2014 1.2377e−06 0.00021594 15.3519 −0.2338
Hong  Kong 2479 29-Aug-2003 13-Jan-2014 1.1084e−06 0.00029628 65.5134 3.1484
Japan  3380 04-Jan-2001 13-Jan-2014 9.6021e−07 0.00019432 59.3879 2.3455
Malaysia 3321 23-Apr-2001 13-Jan-2014 −1.3894e−06 0.00056761 159.714 1.0161
Norway 2657 24-Oct-2003 13-Jan-2014 4.1095e−07 0.00011122 47.1808 0.64787
New  Zealand 2429 31-Jul-2003 13-Jan-2014 1.7824e−06 0.00028063 36.5511 0.46946
Romania 3051 21-Mar-2002 13-Jan-2014 −1.1689e−05 0.0010779 96.6887 −2.8478
Sweden 3008 29-May-2001 13-Jan-2014 3.2633e−07 0.00015686 31.691 0.50626
Singapore 1896 18-Jul-2003 23-Mar-2012 4.8426e−06 0.00016737 547.7068 17.8006
Turkey 3387 19-Jan-2001 13-Jan-2014 -8.7661e−06 0.0014769 72.3195 3.6072
Russia 3215 18-Sep-2001 13-Jan-2014 −1.8761e−05 0.0012738 88.5448 2.6698
United States 2581 01-Dec-2003 13-Jan-2014 1.0715e−06 0.00012687 20.2746 0.79051
Venezuela 3361 26-Feb-2001 13-Jan-2014 1.5273e−05 0.003007 57.8959 0.54851
Note: Summary statistics for the CDS spread sample. The ﬁrst column is the name of the country. The second column indicates the total number of available observations,
that  is the total number of CDS spreads (one-lag differences) sampled at daily frequency. The third column is the starting date of the series, that is when the ﬁrst CDS spread
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hy  the termination date is reported here for CDS spreads but omitted in Tables 4 a
nd  skewness of the corresponding series for the entire sample.
ejection rates under the null. In order to validate the statistical sig-
iﬁcance of the results shown in Figs. 1 and 3 we  perform a simple
onte Carlo experiment. For each equity and bond series in the
ataset we randomly extract with replacement 400 observations
rom the corresponding time-series, hence forming a new set of 33
quity log-returns and 36 bond yield variations. The choice of 400
bservations is dictated by the need of reproducing the sample size
sed for the estimation of the causal networks. After a new set of
ootstrapped equity-bond data is formed, we proceed in the esti-
ation of the three casual networks and we record the percentage
f validated links at 5% conﬁdence level. We  iterate this procedure
or 1000 times and we plot in Fig. 11 the density plots of the three
ercentages of validated links, one for each type of causality. The
orizontal lines in Figs. 1 and 3 are in correspondence of the average
ercentage of 5%-validated links computed over the 1000 replica-
ions. These values are 6.8%, 6.6% and 5.2% for, respectively, the
Ej ⇒ BBuyi ), (Ej ⇒ BSelli ) and (Ej ⇒ Bi) causal networks. The slightly
arger values found for the networks of tail causality is mainly a
onsequence of the unavoidable smaller statistic of the tail events.
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